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level approach, this paper explores how remittances have affected households coping 
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political economy. The policy implications are explored. 
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Introduction 
 
Migrants’ remittances – the money that migrants send home - are a significant financial 
flow to developing countries: officially recorded remittances totalled $160 billion in 
2004, compared with $166 billion Foreign Direct Investment and $79 billion Official 
Development Assistance (World Bank 2006a). In recent years, considerable attention has 
been paid by researchers and policy-makers to the effects of remittances in migrants’ 
countries of origin. Remittances have been highlighted as significant in many conflict-
affected countries, but this is only just beginning to generate research. Conflict research 
largely overlooks remittances, focusing instead on more dramatic local-global links 
related to aid, crime and terrorism. The remittances literature largely avoids conflict-
affected settings as they do not seem to fit with dominant understandings of remittance 
behaviour and the upbeat migration-development consensus. As we shall see, analysis of 
remittances contributes to understandings of how households cope with conflict and 
fragility, and focusing on fragile and conflict settings nuances understandings of the 
migration-development nexus. 
 
The Republic of Somalia is key example. The conflict provoked massive emigration and 
estimates suggest that remittances are a significant financial flow. Although Somali 
money transfer arrangements have been subject to increasing international scrutiny since 
September 11th 2001, little is known about the dynamics of remittances in Somali 
households and communities. Using a micro-level approach, this paper explores 
remittances in Hargeisa, a northern Somali city, the capital of the self-declared, 
unrecognized Republic of Somaliland. Although in many respects the city is in a phase of 
post-conflict reconstruction, it remains a fragile setting.  
 
The paper article addresses four key questions. First, what are the patterns of remittances 
and who is involved? Second, how do remittances reflect or affect social relations? Third, 
what roles do remittances play in the livelihoods of recipient households? Fourth, how do 
remittances affect the wider community? 
 
The first section of this article makes the case for addressing remittances in fragile 
settings, exploring relevant literature. The second section situates Hargeisa in the Somali 
context. The third section explains the research approach. The next four sections address 
each of the research questions. The conclusions summarise the findings and explore 
policy implications. 
 
1. Remittances in Fragile Settings 
 
A recent state-of–the-art review found that evidence on remittances in conflict and fragile 
settings is scattered and limited (Fagen 2006). On one hand, literature on conflict and 
fragility has largely ignored remittances. Collier briefly explored the role of the diaspora 
in conflict situations using econometric methods, suggesting that diasporas in OECD 
countries increase the risk of a post-conflict society relapsing into conflict – because, he 
argues, diasporas may fund armed factions (Collier 2000; World Bank 2003). Overall, 
conflict literature has tended to study global links that are primarily related to criminal or 
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terrorist activity, aid, regional refugee and conflict spill-over, or the political 
machinations of belligerent diasporas, rather than opening up the less dramatic issue of 
migrants’ roles in everyday livelihoods. Refugee studies, for its part, has only recently 
begun to look at refugees as economic actors, rather than political victims (Jacobsen 
2006). 
 
There is some movement, however. Livelihood studies in conflict-affected settings and 
studies of the transnational practices of refugees have highlighted remittances (for 
example, Al-Ali, Black et al. 2001; Horst 2006; Stites and Lautze 2005; Riak Akuei 
2005; Van Hear 2002; Young, Monim Osman et al. 2005). The UK Overseas 
Development Institute recently commissioned a series of case studies on remittances in 
conflict or disaster-affected places (of which this study was part) to address the gap in the 
literature and explore the implications for humanitarian actors. 
 
On the other hand, the growing literature on migration, remittances and development has 
largely by-passed conflict-affected countries, for three main reasons. First, there is the 
conceptual challenge of reconciling the notion of migration and remittances as a 
deliberate economic strategy with the realities of forced migration. The dominant micro-
economic model of remittance behavior, the ‘new economics of labor migration’, 
conceptualizes migration as an economic strategy to diversify household income sources 
in response to local constraints (Taylor 1999). Migrants may remit because of altruism, 
self-interest, mutual insurance motives, or loan repayment obligations (Stark and Lucas 
1998). In this model, the household acts as if it has a preconceived notion of what its 
members will gain from migration, and remittances are central to this. However, many 
people flee conflict with the primary aim of saving their lives. In such contexts, the 
relationship between the decision to migrate and that to remit seems much messier.  
 
Second, in recent years there has been great emphasis on the positive effects of 
remittances on the development of migrants’ countries of origin (Maimbo and Ratha 
2005). Given the popular view of conflict-affected countries as undergoing an all-
pervasive disruption or failure of development,1 it is little wonder that these countries 
have tended to remain off the radar of the generally upbeat migration-development 
research agenda. 
 
The third obstacle for migration-development analyses in addressing conflict and fragile 
settings is a lack of data. There are deficiencies in many countries’ official remittance 
data: official records often exclude transfers made through non-bank channels, and fail to 
capture the often large transfers through informal channels (World Bank 2006a).2 In 
fragile settings, where government capacity may be limited and formal financial systems 
disrupted or mistrusted, data quality can be particularly poor. 
 
But why should analyses of conflict and fragility pay attention to remittances? And why 
should those interested in the role of migration in migrants’ countries of origin examine 
the dynamics in conflict-affected and fragile settings? 
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Many refugees do remit. While rigid legal and policy separations are made between 
forced/politically-motivated/refugee migration and voluntary/economically-
motivated/labour migration, real life is often more complicated. Sociological analyses 
conceptualise migration in terms of a force-choice continuum, and suggest that both 
political and economic factors may play a part in refugee migration (Hayden 2006; 
Richmond 1994; UNHCR 2006; Van Hear 1998) First, economic factors can influence 
the decisions of people leaving conflict-affected countries – where possible they often 
chose to go where they can find work or gain political status. Second, it would seem from 
the evidence of refugees remitting (Ali-Ali et al. 2001; Horst 2006; Riak Akuei 2005) 
that even people who left their country precipitously and with no economic strategy may 
nevertheless be called upon to assist family members back home. 
 
Thus, remittances are part of the experiences of many people – at home and abroad – who 
are affected by conflict and fragility. Migrants’ income is unlikely to be positively 
correlated with the risks faced by family members back home and there is some evidence 
that remittances insure insecure households, smoothing their income during difficult 
times (Schrieder and Knerr 2000; Gubert 2002). At the macro-level, there is some 
evidence that remittance inflows can be counter-cyclical, increasing during crises, for 
example economic downturns or natural disasters (World Bank 2006a). 
 
Furthermore, focusing on migration and remitting in conflict and fragile settings gives the 
opportunity to extend and nuance migration-development analysis. The countries where 
remittances represent the largest proportions of GDP are, in general, not icons of upward 
mobility on the global scale.3 Many have, or have had in the past, problems with conflict 
or repressive regimes that in part explain their now large diasporas (for example, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Haiti, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Philippines, Serbia and 
Montenegro and Tajikistan). Although remittances are undeniably hugely important to 
these economies, it is far from proven that remittances are setting off cycles of 
endogenous growth in these fragile settings. 
 
 
2. Situating Hargeisa in the Somali context 
 
Somalia’s political upheavals over the last two decades provoked large-scale emigration. 
In 1991, the dictator Siyad Barre was ousted, but the political factions failed to agree on a 
new government, leading to the collapse of the state and protracted conflict. Somaliland 
(the north west, a former British protectorate) declared independence in 1991, although 
its secession has not been officially recognized by other governments, including the 
Transitional Federal Government, which is currently struggling for control in the south of 
Somalia. 
 
With a population of around 6.4 million, there are at least one million Somalians now 
living abroad (UNDP 2001). Their remittances reach family members in wrecked cities, 
refugee camps and remote rural areas. The Somali money transfer enterprises, known as 
xawilaad, came under scrutiny in 2001 when the largest enterprise, Al Barakaat, was 
closed based on US allegations of links to Al Qaida. This disrupted remittances to some 
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areas in the short-term, and raised international awareness of the role of remittances in 
the Somali economy and the importance of money transfer services (Maimbo 2006).  
 
There are no official remittance data for Somalia, but estimates based on household 
surveys and money transfer company figures suggest that remittances may amount to 
$700 million–1 billion per year, of which $360 million is believed to be directed at family 
living expenses (Omer and El Koury 2005; World Bank 2006b).4 Compared with 
estimated exports and imports of $265 million and $461 million respectively in 2004, and 
international aid of $170 million in 2002, remittances are clearly a significant financial 
flow (World Bank 2006b). According to the 2001 Human Development Report on 
Somalia, remittances have a ‘wide-ranging impact on human development choices.’ 
(UNDP 2001:132). The limited available evidence suggests that that they represent a 
major source of income for a substantial minority of (particularly urban) households 
(Medani 2000, Ahmed 2000). However, little research has been done on the dynamics of 
remittances in Somali households and communities. 
 
Thus, this study took a micro-level approach, selecting Hargeisa, a major Somali city 
located in a highland area of Somaliland, as the research site because of its size, relative 
stability and the reported significance of remittances. The residents, particularly the Isaq 
majority,5 suffered mounting state repression in the 1980s, culminating in civil war 
between the rebel Somali National Movement (SNM) and the government in 1988. The 
conflict devastated and virtually emptied the city: people of all social groups fled to rural 
areas, to neighbouring Ethiopia and Djibouti, and further afield to the Middle East, 
Europe and North America (Africa Watch 1990). In 1991, internally displaced people and 
refugees began to return to a bombed-out and nearly deserted Hargeisa, now the capital 
of Somaliland. Civil strife among Isaq clans in 1994-1996 displaced tens of thousands of 
civilians in and around the city. From 1997, large numbers of refugees were repatriated 
from Ethiopia. Some of those ‘resettling’ in Hargeisa had not lived there before the war, 
but were Isaq fleeing Mogadishu, minority groups persecuted in the South, or pastoralists 
seeking casual work (Frushone 2001; Ambroso 2002; Cabdi 2005; World Bank 2006b).  
 
Since 1997, Somaliland has been more stable than other parts of the collapsed Republic, 
although the eastern border is disputed with Puntland (the regional administration in the 
north eastern zone). In Hargeisa, public order problems or flare-ups of violence are fairly 
uncommon. Considerable progress has been made in building a democratic political 
system.6 The government raises some revenue from business, and provides some public 
services, supplemented by community-based, NGO and private initiatives. Hargeisa’s 
population is well over 300,000, and may reach half a million.7 There is widespread 
hardship: UNDP (2003) estimates that nearly a quarter of urban Somalis live on less than 
US$1 per day. Somaliland, including Hargeisa, was hit hard economically by the Gulf 
states’ bans on imports of Somali livestock (due to disease outbreaks) in 1998 and 200l. 
Emigration continues: although ever fewer countries give full refugee status to 
Somalilanders, people still go abroad, looking for work or education opportunities or 
rejoining family members. 
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Hargeisa holds a complex position in the global political economy. Somalia is a 
collapsed, conflict-ridden state that some have preferred to think of as a stateless society 
(Brons 2001). Within Somalia’s 1960 borders, Somaliland has emerged as a fragile, 
unrecognised state. Hargeisa is the capital of a country that in an international juridical 
sense does not exist. While in many respects the city is in a phase of post-conflict 
reconstruction, the social, economic and political uncertainties faced by its people are 
persistent and significant, justifying its description as a fragile setting (Binzel and Brück 
2007). 
 
 
3. Research approach 
 
The research was guided by two principles. First, various researchers emphasize the need 
for fine-grained studies of conflict-affected locations which situate their exploration of 
individual and household livelihood strategies in the wider political and economic 
context (Collinson 2003; Goodhand 2000). This small-scale study aimed to explore the 
role of remittances both in recipients’ lives and livelihoods and in their wider community. 
 
Second, remittance studies tend to draw on survey data and focus on the economic 
dimensions of remittances. Economic anthropology and sociology emphasise the social 
embeddedness of economic action, encouraging analysis of both economic transactions 
and ‘the quality of relationships which these transactions create, express, sustain, and 
modify,’ (Firth 1967: 4).8 In conflict and fragile settings, where social relations may be 
subject to complex change, it is particularly important to explore the social texture as 
well as the economic dimensions of remittances. This encourages the use of ethnographic 
as well as survey methods. 
 
The research, conducted in Hargeisa in March and August-September 2005, used a three-
pronged approach. The first element involved observations, informal conversations, and 
consultations with relevant people, including money transfer operators, NGO workers, 
and government officials. The second element involved semi-structured interviews with 
thirteen Hargeisa residents to explore the role of migration and remittances in their lives. 
Contacted through personal acquaintances, NGO workers and school teachers, the male 
and female interviewees were of a variety of clans, occupations and ages. Some 
interviews were carried out in English, in others an interpreter was used. The aim was not 
to obtain a representative sample of people living in Hargeisa, but to provide some 
detailed examples of remittance relationships in context. In citing interviews, people’s 
names and some other details have been changed to preserve their anonymity.  
 
It was not practical for this study to survey of the general population of Hargeisa. Instead, 
the third element of the research involved a survey of 538 remittance recipients, 
exploring who receives remittances, how much, how often, from whom, since when, and 
the role in their livelihoods. The most common method of sending money is through 
Somali money transfer enterprises which charge a four to six percent fee. Migrants in 
certain locations sometimes send money through traders or friends, but given the efficient 
service and wide coverage of the money transfer enterprises, this is uncommon. 
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Dahabshiil is the longest-established Somali MTO and has by far the largest share of the 
market in Hargeisa with many more branches than other enterprises.9 The enterprise gave 
permission to approach recipients collecting remittances from local branches. The survey 
was carried out in twelve branches across the city over a six-day period at the beginning 
of September, as discussions with money transfer operators and recipients revealed that 
most remittances arrive after emigrants receive their wages abroad. Randomly sampled 
respondents were interviewed in Somali.10 In sum, the sample was not precisely 
representative of the recipient population of Hargeisa, but paints a broadly indicative 
picture of incoming remittances. 
 
 
4. Remittance patterns 
 
The first step was to establish the patterns of incoming remittances and the demographic 
profile of the actors involved. Respondents received average remittances11 of around 
$2,300 in the last twelve months ($190 per month). One quarter of respondents reported 
that another member of their household also received remittances.12 Total estimated 
household remittances averaged around $2,600 per year ($215 per month). For both 
individual and total estimated household remittances, the most common range was 
$1,000-1,499 ($85-125 per month).13 
 
There was diversity in remittance patterns: not all recipients receives money every 
month, or the same amount every month, and some receive money on a more ad-hoc 
basis for specific projects or urgent needs. If we look at the remittance process from the 
perspective of the number of people involved, it is likely that the timing of the survey led 
to over-sampling of people who receive remittances on a monthly basis. Over three 
quarters of respondents had received cash remittances each month or more frequently in 
the last year. However, even in this sample, 7% of recipients had received money three 
times or less in the last year – relatively infrequently. 
 
The age and gender profile of the respondents is shown in Figure 1. Women represented 
just over 60% of the recipients, most recipients were in their 20s-40s, and their average 
household size was 7.7. 14  
 
The age distribution of remittance recipients was broadly similar to Somaliland’s urban 
adult population as a whole, suggesting that remittances do not target particular age 
groups (APD 2004). Average amounts received were similar for women and men, and 
across age groups, except that for those under 20 (who received much less and were 
mainly single students), and those over 50 (who received slightly less, possibly because 
they less commonly care directly for children). 
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Figure 1. Age and gender of respondents 
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Source: Recipient Survey, Hargeisa, Aug-Sept 2005 
 
Most of the 660 migrants who remitted to our respondents in the last twelve months live 
in the UK (41%), the US (12%), UAE (7%), Saudi Arabia (7%) or Canada (6%).15 The 
colonial recruitment of northern Somalis into the Merchant Navy, resulted in small 
communities in the UK which facilitated migration during the conflict. The proximity of 
the Gulf and previous migration in the 1970s and 1980s meant that this was also an 
obvious destination. Around 60% of remitters were men and most were in their thirties or 
forties.16 Average individual receipts were highest from migrants in the UAE and 
Canada, followed by the US and the UK, with only small amounts from neighbouring 
countries. Women sent less on average to individual recipients in Hargeisa ($1,750) than 
men ($2,000). 
 
 
5. Local and transnational social relations 
 
This section first examines how remittances reflect or affect relations of co-residence and 
co-sustenance in Somali society and second explores second how remittances reflect or 
affect gendered and generational family roles. 
 
In Somali society, relationships of co-residence often diverge from the nuclear family 
model. The nomadic hamlet, known as a guri or reer, may include a couple and their 
children, a polygamous family, or a group of families (Lewis 1994). Urban households 
traditionally consist of a married couple and children, but often also include parents, 
siblings and - in better-off households - poorer relatives from the rural areas and domestic 
workers. Moreover, relationships of co-sustenance often involve inter-household links 
within (particularly male) family and clan networks. Around two thirds of the population 
of Somalia live in rural areas, mainly as pastoralists, and there are strong links between 
rural and urban households (World Bank 2006b). Often some of a group of brothers take 
employment in town while the others tend their joint livestock. Pastoralist kin 
traditionally expect assistance in cash and kind from better-off urban relatives (Lewis 
1994). One survey found that around half the urban households in Hargeisa (excluding 
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the poor ‘resettlement’ areas) support relations in pastoralist areas with monthly 
contributions of $10-100 (Medani 2000). 
 
The transnational social relations that channel remittances interweave with these local 
social relations. In contemporary Hargeisa, many people have immediate family members 
in the city, in the rural area, and abroad, with different layers of transfer activity between 
these locations. For example, Hassan, a young teacher, lived in Hargeisa with some 
siblings, and had other siblings in the rural areas, and an older brother who working in a 
factory in the United Arab Emirates. This brother had long looked after the family “like a 
father”, sending money and supporting Hassan through his education. These support 
arrangements could shift: as Hassan said, “Now that I work I said I will take the part of 
the family in the rural area, my brother supports us here in the town.”17 
 
Where migrants support relatives, this can relieve the financial pressure on the family 
network in Hargeisa.18 Also, urban households buoyed by remittances are also often in a 
better position to assist rural relatives. Ali lives with his mother and brothers and his 
mother receives regular remittances from his sister in the UK.19 Often when there is 
drought, his paternal uncle, a pastoralist, comes to stay in Hargeisa. One of the first 
things he does on arrival is call Ali’s sister in Birmingham to ask for help: if she sends 
some money (which she usually does) he goes home. Meanwhile urban relatives are 
expected to provide accommodation and food, and may help in other ways. Ali stressed 
that this is an important part of Somali culture. 
 
Within these strong family networks, to what extent do migration and remittance patterns 
conform to or diverge from habitual gender and generational roles? In urban households, 
men were traditionally the main decision-makers and expected to provide for their 
family: women were discouraged from working outside the home, although petty trade 
was seen as acceptable where necessary (UNIFEM 1998; Cabdi 2005).20 While these 
patterns remain common, the conflict has contributed to changing roles. First, more 
women are alone: the violence left widows, displacement separated other couples, and 
divorce rates rose, often attributed to low wages, joblessness and male qaad use (Cabdi 
2005; World Bank 2006b).21 Second, displacement provoked changes in couples’ roles: 
men’s usual occupations were disrupted; refugee camp rations were allocated by family 
and collected by women; and in extremis women found ways to supplement meagre 
rations (Ambroso 2002; Cabdi 2005). In some families old roles were resumed on return 
to Hargeisa, but overall women play a more active and visible economic role than prior to 
the war.22 
 
How do remittances reflect or play into these role changes? Where a particular 
demographic group migrates there is often a clear set of adjustments to traditional family 
roles and responsibilities (Conway and Cohen 1998). In the Somali case, although 
emigration to the Gulf in the 1970s and 80s was dominated by young men, since the 
conflict there was no clear gender or relationship pattern. Emigrants include men and 
women, young and elderly, the married and the unmarried, parents and children. 
Remittance relationships diversified: Figure 2 shows how remitters were related to 
respondents in Hargeisa. In many cases, the remitter might be traditionally expected to 
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support the recipient: migrant husbands / fathers, adult children supporting their parents, 
and men supporting their brothers and sisters. Siblings were the commonest remittance 
relationship, evidencing that the strong translocal sibling support networks outlined 
earlier also operate at the transnational level.  
 
Figure 2. Remitters’ relationship to recipients by gender of recipient  
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Source: Recipient Survey, Hargeisa, Aug-Sept 2005 
Note: Based on 632 pairings. Father’s and Mother’s family include only uncles and aunts (mainly uncles). 
 
Regarding amounts sent, those in the most direct relationships of responsibility - spouses 
and parents - remitted the highest amounts of remittances, followed by the adult children 
and siblings of recipients, and more distant relatives tended to send the least.  
 
However, while remittances in some ways do reflect traditional pre-war social relations, 
they also indicate the modification of expectations of social contacts. First, a surprising 
portion of recipient-sender relationships cannot be explained by reference to traditional 
family support patterns. While it is common for adult children to support their parents, in 
general co-sustenance relationships with one’s natal family are much stronger for men 
than women. Yet around one tenth of the pairings were daughters supporting their 
parents. Indeed, it is sometimes said that it is better to have one daughter abroad than ten 
sons. While the numbers of daughters and sons remitting to their parents in this survey, 
and the average amounts that they remitted, do not in fact confirm this, the fact that so 
many recipients were supported by daughters overseas is culturally unusual so is 
popularly noted as a relative change. Another example that does not fit with traditional 
patterns of support is that nearly one tenth of the sender-recipient pairings involved a 
woman supporting her brother.  
 
Second, the mode of support may be modified by distance. For example, Amina is well 
over sixty, a widow in poor health, and lives with her sick son. Her three daughters in 
Europe jointly funded the building of a house where she lives with her sick son, and send 
regular remittances for food and other basic expenses, which is Amina’s only income. 
They have not been able to find medical attention for their brother’s condition but 
without their assistance, he would probably be destitute or dead. Amina’s brother and 
sister help her care for her son and with household tasks. If Amina’s daughters lived in 
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Hargeisa, she would probably live with one of them as part of their household. Thus, 
traditional support arrangements may be replaced by cash and surrogate care work by 
other family members.  
 
The survey illustrates that within households across Hargeisa, remittances put money in 
the hands of a variety of female and junior relatives. Interviews in London suggest that 
migrants tend to remit money to female relatives because they are responsible for buying 
and cooking food: some fear male relatives will spend the money on qaad or on marrying 
a second wife rather than prioritising the collective needs of the existing family.23 
Women receiving regular money through xawilaad may have more control of the 
household economy than those relying on a male breadwinner: some recipients 
interviewed certainly seemed to manage their household with very little input or 
influence from their husbands or sons. However, it remains unclear to what extent 
women’s access to remittances – or indeed cash from employment or business - gives 
them a stronger voice in wider family affairs. Research on the impact of cash transfers to 
women in other contexts cautions against assuming that more cash automatically 
translates into greater influence over male relatives’ behaviour - often strong cultural 
factors mitigate against that (Adato and de la Brière et al. 2000; Kabeer 2000). Moreover, 
research in urban Somaliland suggests that women’s increased economic role has not yet 
translated into a stronger voice in the male-dominated world of family and clan politics 
(Cabdi 2005). 
 
 
5. Livelihoods 
 
This section examines the role of remittances in livelihoods, including their role during 
crises. Ubax’s case illustrates how remittances can be one element in a portfolio of 
livelihood strategies.24 She is in her late forties and used to live in Mogadishu, but moved 
to Hargeisa in 1991 after one of her daughters was shot dead. Her husband and six of her 
children live with her. She has many siblings and half-siblings in Hargeisa and the 
surrounding rural areas and two brothers in the UK (her father had six wives). When they 
first arrived in Hargeisa, the family survived by her making and selling sweets outside the 
Madrassa. Then she got on an NGO training scheme and became a health worker. Her 
wages were fixed by the government several years ago at 240,000 SlSh per month, 
initially worth around $70, but now worth half that. The rent of their house is $100 per 
month and her husband is jobless. To supplement her wages, she runs a small pharmacy 
business, performs female circumcisions and delivers babies. When money is tight she 
can also earn money doing polio vaccinations, attending or giving health seminars, and 
selling headscarves with her daughters. Her brothers in the UK send $100 each month to 
pay for the children’s education: one son attends Hargeisa University and two others 
attend a private secondary school. Her household is comfortably-off: her rural siblings 
often come to her for help when they are sick or need help. 
 
Figure 3 shows recipients’ economic activities: around a quarter did paid work outside 
the home, but the largest group were housewives.  
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Figure 3. Main paid work and other activities by gender 
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Source: Recipient Survey, Hargeisa, Aug-Sept 2005 
 
Overall, in 45% of respondents’ households, remittances were combined with other 
income from employment, self-employment and business or other assets. In the rest – a 
slim majority of households – remittances were the only source of income for 
recipients.25 Figure 4 shows how recipients answered questions about whether or not they 
had used remittances for a series of specific purposes in the last twelve months.  
 
Figure 4. Uses of remittances during the last 12 months 
Biil
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Education expenses
Health expenses
Rent
Land / house
Business investment
Pay debt
Social event
Pay for emigration
Savings
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Gift
6005004003002001000
 
Source: Recipient Survey, Hargeisa, Aug-Sept 2005 
Note: Count reflects number of respondents using remittances for this purpose. 
 
While remittances may be the only source of income, or be tagged for specific purposes, 
the possible fungibility of remittances in the household budget means that close analysis 
of the impact of remittances on household spending and investment decisions is not 
possible based on our limited survey data.26 However, three observations may be made 
regarding the role of remittances in recipients’ livelihood portfolios, based largely on the 
qualitative interviews. 
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First, the money is commonly used for consumption and human capital investments. The 
vast majority of respondents – 96% - said that they use remittances for biil, or regular 
living expenses.27 Education is usually a high priority and often something  specifically 
encouraged by migrants (Lindley 2006). Although earlier accounts ignored the 
significance of this, it since since been recognised that spending on consumption not only 
improves recipients’ welfare but can have multiplier effects in the local economy, and 
that investments in education can improve long-term economic prospects (Durand et al. 
1996; Connell and Conway 2000). Remittances were also used in Hargeisa in ways that 
reinforce the social networks of recipients - for example for weddings, social events, 
chewing qaad with friends, clan compensation and gifts, or financing the emigration of 
relatives – investment in social networks can be particularly important in an uncertain 
economic climate. 
 
Second, some of the money is invested in building local livelihoods. Interviews suggest 
that although investments in business, land and property are fairly infrequent, they can be 
large and life-changing. Some migrants send working capital for shops, import and export 
businesses, and taxi, bus or trucking businesses. The emphasis is on retail and wholesale 
trade and services, reflecting the urban economy as a whole: lack of infrastructure and 
political uncertainty stymies industrial production. Other migrants have been called on to 
help rebuild or build family homes, and increasingly invest in land and property on their 
own behalf.28 Overall, remittance investment, as in other countries, depends on the 
recipient’s economic situation (many do not have much surplus money) and the 
investment climate (options may be limited) (Goldring 2004). Diaspora poverty is a 
further constraint as many migrants cannot afford to send enough to invest in business.29  
 
However, it is important to note that even when not directly invested, remittances can 
indirectly foster local livelihoods. Nimco’s case is illustrative. She is in her sixties and 
used to live in Mogadishu but returned to Hargeisa (where she was born) with her 
husband and children in 1991.30 Her husband then re-married, moved out and stopped 
supporting her, but she stays on in the family house, which he owns, with one single and 
two married sons, a daughter-in-law, four grandchildren, and a nephew. She has other 
grown-up children elsewhere in Hargeisa, Mogadishu, and Ethiopia and two daughters 
who went to the Middle East then married Somali British men and moved to the UK. 
Nimco’s eldest son used to provide for the household, working as a sheep and goat trader, 
but was forced out of business in 2000 by the import ban on Somali livestock. He started 
a small grocery shop, but they were still struggling. Another son is a mason and could 
earn up to $10 a day, but only got a few days’ work a month. Nimco telephoned her 
daughter in the UK who had remitted occasionally to ask for more regular help and she 
began sending $300 every other month. The shop now generates enough to feed the 
family. The remittances cover school fees, water, electricity and other expenses. In this 
example, remittances allowed the family to manage during adverse economic conditions 
– when business was bad and unemployment high – thus releasing pressure on the shop’s 
profit margins, preventing them from eating into their capital.  
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A third observation regarding the role of remittance in livelihood portfolios relates to the 
labour effort of those at home. Figure 5 shows an (imperfect) economic activity 
comparison between the Hargeisa recipient sample and the general Somalia / Somaliland 
urban population. Our respondents have higher employment, lower unemployment, and 
higher economic inactivity rates than the general population.  
 
Figure 5. Comparison of economic activity of individual remittance recipients with 
the general population 
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Sources: 1. Recipient Survey, Hargeisa, Aug-Sept 2005. 2. Urban Somaliland data from APD (2004, Draft) 
3. Urban Somalia data from UNDP (2003) 
Note: These results are interpreted with caution. First, the indicators used in all the three surveys for 
working status are fairly crude and do not take account of seasonal employment and under-employment 
(‘Working’ rates here refers to the number of working age adults in work divided by the number of 
working age adults in the sample). Second, the data is not directly comparable: there are no baseline data 
available for Hargeisa specifically and there is a difference in the age bracketing: figures are for 15-64 year 
olds, except for remittance recipients, which were for under 20-60 year olds.  
 
While the evidence does not allow us to assess causality in the relationship between 
remittances and economic activity, three points should be noted. First, the higher 
economic inactivity rate may be because recipients are more likely to be able to get by 
without actively looking for work. But the direction of causality may run the other way, 
as remittances may be directed towards those who are economically inactive in the first 
place, particularly married women and the elderly. Second, the slightly higher 
employment rate among recipients may suggest an upward spiral whereby remittances 
improve recipients’ economic opportunities through investment in local livelihoods. This 
suggestion is supported by the fact that employed or self-employed recipients received 
higher remittances than the rest - at the individual and household level.31 However, again 
the direction of causality is uncertain: as we shall see, better-off families were more 
likely to have migrants overseas in the first place. Third, additional factors may shape the 
effect of remittances on the labour effort of recipients, including whether or not they feel 
that remittances will continue in the medium to long term, and whether they are enough 
to meet the family’s basic needs (conditions more likely to prevail where large income 
disparities exist between Hargeisa and the migrant’s host country). Different interviewees 
took different views regarding whether remittances generate dependency, emphasising 
the high unemployment levels, limited local opportunities and the importance of the 
attitude of the recipients. 
 
Role of remittances in livelihood crises 
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Of particular relevance to studying remittances in conflict-affected and fragile settings is 
the concept that migration is a household income diversification strategy and that 
remittances can insure households against risks. Two issues deserve consideration.  
 
First, on the face of it, as pointed out earlier, the concept of migration as a deliberate 
household economic strategy, with remittances as the anticipated gain sits uneasily beside 
the image of forced migration. Migration from Hargeisa in 1988-1991 and the mid 1990s 
was precipitated by serious political violence, in which thousands of people were killed. 
People decided to leave the city and the country not to diversify their income but to save 
their lives. Yet while outward movement from Hargeisa was motivated by the need to 
seek physical safety, choice of destination or onward movement from neighbouring 
countries was often understandably influenced by economic considerations. Many of 
those who could afford to do so chose to seek asylum in the West. The author’s research 
in the UK suggests that for people who migrated overseas during this period, the prospect 
of sending remittances was not an explicit part of their or their families’ decisions: rather 
they went to seek safety or to escape the hardships, uncertainties and lack of rights in 
neighbouring countries, in the hope of generally better future. Yet many of these refugees 
turned into remitters, suggesting that even when migration is not deliberately undertaken 
in order to diversify household income sources, it may have this effect. Moreover, as the 
1990s progressed, with an unrecognised Somaliland moving between fragile peace and 
resurgent conflict, followed by the economic downturn, the economic rationale for 
migration, including the possibility of supporting family members back home, became 
increasingly salient. This view from Hargeisa suggests that in conflict-affected settings 
there is a more unsettled relationship between the act of emigration and the act of 
remitting than that envisaged in the dominant remittance behaviour model. 
 
Second, there is the notion of remittances responding to crises experienced by family 
members. Five main types of crisis affected Hargeisa’s residents in the last two decades, 
illustrating a mixture of ‘shock’ and ‘institutional’ channels of conflict and fragility 
described by Binzel and Brück (2007): 
• Outright conflict in 1988-1991 and 1994-1996, which destroyed homes and 
assets, disrupted livelihoods, and killed or displaced civilians.  
• On-going crisis of state institutions - while Somaliland’s political future remains 
uncertain, foreign investment steers clear, inward investment is cautious, most aid 
is directed through NGOs and government capacity remains limited (Gaani 2005).  
• Urban ramifications of disruptions to the pastoral economy, such as food 
shortages, social conflict, forced sale of livestock at depressed prices, and the 
urbanisation of pastoralists.32 The import bans on Somali livestock had serious 
consequences in the city economy (King 2003; Gaani 2005). 
• Exchange rate depreciations: unless wages keep pace, imports become too 
expensive. The Somaliland shilling, introduced in 1994, depreciated steeply 
against the dollar when the government printed large quantities of new currency:  
in the mid-1990s to finance the war effort; in 2003 apparently to finance the 
electoral campaign; and in 2000 after the livestock ban was imposed (King 2003). 
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• Personal crises of people’s everyday lives – asset loss, livelihood deterioration or 
collapse, and violence, death, displacement, illness, family break-up – occurring 
within and frequently linked to the wider institutional fragility. 
 
At the micro-level, asking migrant relatives for assistance was as one of several 
mechanisms for coping with income shocks (whether a loss of income or the emergence 
of a large necessary expense) in the households of interviewees. If successful, there may 
be an increase in the amount remitted, the initiation of regular remittances for subsistence 
(for a period or permanently) or a one-off transfer. As in Nimco’s case above, remittances 
are often are initially sought and sent during a time of particular stress, but appear are 
easier to start than stop or decrease. The majority of recipients surveyed reported that 
their remitters have continued to send the same amount in dollars since they began 
remitting, or increased the amount that they send. Funds from abroad can help prevent 
liquidation of local assets, destitution and displacement. They can also help reverse these 
processes when they have taken place: rebuilding assets, providing basic needs, and 
facilitating resettlement. 
 
Some commentators have claimed that the flow of remittances to Somalia increases 
during periods of economic stress or inter-clan warfare (e.g. Gaani 2005). Although 
longitudinal data on migration and remittance volumes is not available, Figure 6 shows 
that contemporary remitters left in large numbers at the turn of the decade, when the civil 
war in the north was at its height; in the mid 1990s, a time of renewed civil strife in 
Hargeisa; and in 1999, corresponding to the first Saudi livestock export ban. 40% of the 
remitters began sending money within two years of arriving. There was a significant peak 
in recipients beginning to receive remittances in 2000-2003: over 40% of these 
remittance senders began sending during that recent short period. 
 
Figure 6. Years of emigration of remitter, arrival in current country of residence 
and initiation of remittances 
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Source: Recipient Survey, Hargeisa, Aug-Sept 2005 
 
This marked ‘triggering’ of remittance activity in 2000-2003, might be explained in two 
main ways. First, it may be due to the timing of emigration: possibly the large numbers of 
people who left Somalia in the early 1990s were more able to send remittances as they 
got more socio-economically settled abroad.33 Second, migrants may have begun to remit 
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in this period in response to events in Hargeisa. The most obvious trigger is the second 
Gulf livestock import ban in 2000, which deprived Somali pastoralists of the most 
important markets for their livestock. The resulting general economic slowdown affected 
all businesses in Hargeisa and government bodies which lost tax revenue. Remittance 
companies reported an increase in the volume of remittances received during the 
livestock ban (Cabdi 2005; World Bank 2006b).34 It is a popular belief in Hargeisa that 
“Remittances have occupied the space vacated by livestock trade.”35 Remittances may 
also be initiated in response to inward migration to Hargeisa, with the resettlement of 
people displaced by conflict in the mid-1990s, and the urbanisation of struggling 
pastoralists. The consolidation of democracy in Somaliland since 2001 may also have 
encouraged migrants to begin to send money, re-investing in family networks and 
livelihoods in anticipation of returning or otherwise re-engaging with their place of 
origin, or to support dependents who have returned. These issues might be explored in 
further research, ideally with longitudinal data on remittance amounts. 
 
Meanwhile, it is important to note that while remittances may be triggered by income 
shocks, lack of remittances would be a serious shock for many households: “Many 
households would suffer significant setbacks in food security and access to private 
medical care and private schools if remittance flows were interrupted.” (UNDP 2001: 
131). Moreover, they insulate households against local currency depreciations as they are 
received in hard currency (then converted into Somaliland Shillings). If the local 
currency weakens against the dollar, recipients are better able to afford imported goods 
than those on local wages 
 
 
7. Wider effects 
 
The effects of remittances are not limited to the recipients and their families, but ripple 
out into the wider community in a variety of ways. This section examines the distribution 
of remittances in the city, the wider repercussions of spending and investment, and 
effects on the wider political economy. 
 
Fortunes in conflict settings may be made and lost: it is hard to pin down the effects of 
remittances on a shaken and evolving social order (Binzel and Brück 2007). Yet even 
before counting any other sources of income, remittance recipients are much better off 
than average Somaliland town-dwellers. Around $200 a month is generally seen as 
enough to meet all the living expenses of a normal Hargeisa household - the average per 
capita urban household income is $491 per year (APD 2004).36 This means that 
remittances tended to reinforce middle-income households, or life poorer households into 
the middle-income group (see also King 2003). Remittances less often benefit the poorest 
people in Hargeisa, who survive by casual work or begging - many live in miserable 
conditions in nine particularly deprived areas of the city.37 An earlier survey found that 
remittances were the main source of income for 23% of urban households in Hargeisa, 
but only 5% of the households in these poor areas (Medani 2000).  
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Remittances are also differentiated along clan lines. Large numbers of the Isaq majority 
were displaced in 1988 and there has been significant migration to the West, building on 
earlier communities, such that receiving remittances among these clans is fairly 
common.38 While Darod people - fewer in number in Hargeisa - were displaced in 1991 
and also went West, for the Dir and small minority groups emigration was more rare - a 
fact attributed to more sedentary customs, lack of an existing overseas community, and 
resource constraints.39  
 
However, social networks and market relations ensure a certain amount of redistribution 
of the gains of migration. Social networks rarely feature in analyses of remittance effects, 
but in Hargeisa are an important vehicle for the circulation of remittances in the 
economy, sharing the gains with rural relatives and neighbouring households often in 
very informal, commonplace ways. For example, sharing food with poorer neighbours – 
indeed, with anyone who turns up around lunchtime - is common. The religious and 
social practices of sako (zakaat or compulsory alms), sadaka (voluntary alms) and 
qaraan (clan-based collections), target people needing help, and may be collected in the 
diaspora and in Somali society (Le Sage and Menkhaus 2004). Furthermore, around one 
fifth of respondents said that remittances that they received had been spent on magta or 
diya - clan-based compensation usually for injury or death (Lewis 1994). This reinforces 
traditional mechanisms of resolving conflicts that otherwise might escalate, and helps the 
victim’s family cope with the crisis. Thus, remittances support existing social buffers: as 
money is drawn from the diaspora to Hargeisa, so money and resources are drawn from 
better-off to poorer households, and from urban to rural households.40 
 
The circulation of remittances via consumption and investment affects the wider 
economy. Remittances buoy demand for locally produced goods and services (milk, 
meat, charcoal, fruit and vegetables, education, health, domestic work, construction, 
telecommunications) and imported goods (rice, pasta, sugar, cooking oil, Ethiopian qaad, 
consumer goods, vehicles, construction materials and petrol). Through civil war and 
economic downturn, the fact that a portion - albeit a minority - of the city’s population 
receives regular dollar amounts and others are sometimes able to call on their assistance, 
has been crucial in stabilising demand in Hargeisa. The remittance-fuelled boom in 
construction generates casual employment for city-dwellers and rural migrants - in 2003, 
there were twelve construction companies in Hargeisa, and several brick-making 
businesses (Hargeisa Municipality 2003; King 2003).41 
 
Family remittances and diaspora donations have direct and indirect repercussions in the 
wider political realm. First, the diaspora supported the war effort and subsequently helped 
to build a political system in Somaliland. The Somali National Movement, established in 
Saudi Arabia and the UK, was largely financed by the contributions of Isaq merchants 
and others migrants (Lewis 1994). The three main political parties in Somaliland have 
sought finance abroad as well as locally.42 While civil servants’ and ministers’ wages are 
notoriously low, most have businesses, receive remittances or are returnees from the 
West themselves: in one government office visited for the research, they declared “We 
are all diaspora here”.43 The government does not tax incoming remittances – there would 
 19
be a public outcry – but it does collect some revenue from money transfer enterprises and 
on occasion persuades them to donate to public projects.44 
 
Marchal et al. have suggested that in the southern Somali zone: “One negative aspect of 
remittances is that they have allowed the factions to survive without delivering anything 
to the people,” (2000: 14). In Somaliland, it would seem that the diaspora and their 
remittances have – in direct and indirect ways – both fuelled conflict and helped to secure 
the victory of a faction, and helped a new political system to endure despite delivering 
little more that a delicate peace to the people. 
 
Second, emigrants have sponsored public services in Hargeisa and elsewhere by funding 
the reconstruction and contributing to the running costs of many health facilities and 
schools, as well as by remitting fees to relatives needing to use such services. The 
Somaliland diaspora is been active in fundraising for collective initiatives and many 
would agree with Foreign Minister of Somaliland, Edna Adan Ismail (herself the founder 
of Hargeisa’s only maternity hospital, financed by a combination of diaspora and NGO 
donations and user fees), that “the diaspora has brought Somaliland to where it is 
today.”45  
 
Third, the considerable macro-economic scale of remittances affects Hargeisa. According 
to the Secretary General of the Chamber of Commerce, remittances have contributed to 
rebuilding the asset and capital base of families and communities.46 One interviewee 
summed up the dominant view: “Remittances are the backbone of the Somaliland 
economy… If they were not sent people would not have survived like this.”47 By helping 
some families return, rebuild homes and business, and cope in a difficult economic 
climate, remittances contributed substantially to the repopulation and reconstruction of a 
bombed-out and deserted city. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This paper identified several features of the remittance process in the fragile setting of 
Hargeisa that may be relevant to other fragile and conflict settings, and to general 
understandings of remittances.  
 
The conflict transformed the geography of overseas migration and remitting as for the 
first time significant numbers of people from Hargeisa went to Western Europe and 
North America seeking asylum. Compared with the model of migration and remittances 
as a household income diversification strategy, this study revealed a rather more unsettled 
relationship between the act of emigration and the act of remitting. Large-scale 
emigration from Hargeisa responded to severe violent conflict rather than the wish to 
diversify income sources. Yet many refugees in rich countries still send remittances, even 
though this was not anticipated as they fled their country. Economic considerations – the 
wish for more secure political and economic rights and opportunities than those available 
in neighbouring countries and in some cases explicitly to support relatives left behind – 
were more prominent when it came to choice of destination, onward migration, and later 
migration as Hargeisa moved from a conflict to a fragile setting.  
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The importance of wider family networks (often reaching into rural areas) in co-
sustenance and in remittance dynamics in Hargeisa called into question the use of the 
nuclear household as the main and exclusive unit of analysis in remittance studies. There 
is a somewhat uneven transnationalisation of family relationships and roles, with a 
significant portion of remittance relationships breaking with conventional patterns of 
family financial support. Due to the conflict, there has been a diversification – 
particularly, a growing feminisation – of participation in the remittance process. All this 
underlines the importance of exploring the social relations of remitting in fragile settings. 
 
Remittances play a significant role in the livelihoods of regular recipients in Hargeisa and 
are commonly used for general living expenses and human capital investments. 
Remittances are sometimes invested in business and property, although diaspora poverty 
and local constraints inhibit the building up alternative local livelihoods. The evidence in 
this study suggests that remittances may help mitigate the effects of conflict and fragility 
on the population of Hargeisa, but that this often leads to a more permanent remittance 
relationship.  
 
Remittances have several wider effects in Hargeisa. They tend to benefit middle income 
households and the Isaq majority. However, considerable social recirculation of 
remittances was evident, something which has rarely featured in the remittance literature 
reviewed. Diaspora donations and remittances directly and indirectly shaped the political 
and economic development of Hargeisa as capital of Somaliland in the last twenty years, 
fuelling the insurgency and the fledgling democracy, but some of the most significant 
effects are simply making life more liveable in a fragile post-conflict context. However 
this micro-level perspective reveals that many of the local benefits of remittances in 
Hargeisa are associated with repairing damage caused by the conflict via reconstruction 
and regeneration of destroyed homes, infrastructure, and public goods. 
 
More research would be necessary to ascertain to what extent these patterns apply 
elsewhere in the urban and rural Somali areas of the Horn of Africa. In particular, the 
migration patterns of people from different areas vary, as do institutional contexts and the 
types of shocks to which households are exposed, especially in more violent areas. 
 
What are the policy implications of this research? The proposition emerging from this 
study is definitely not that remittances can compensate for the massive loss of people 
(labour power and human capital) and the devastation of livelihoods and infrastructure 
resulting from the conflict. But the diaspora is a lasting legacy of the Somali conflict and 
it is likely to continue to shape Somali society in the decades to come. The fragile 
institutional context has constrained the extent to which remittances have been able to 
contribute to cycles of endogenous growth. It is important to remember that although 
remittances improve the welfare of recipients, this does not automatically translate - even 
in non-fragile contexts - into broader-based liberal development in the country of origin 
as more euphoric migration-development accounts sometimes suggest, unless appropriate 
political and economic infrastructure is in place (Ballard 2003; Connell and Conway 
2000; de Haas 2006). Concentrating on improving political and economic infrastructure 
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in fragile settings, which is already seen as a development priority, is likely to be the best 
way to maximize the benefits of remittances for the wider community in the long term.  
 
Meanwhile, these findings support Kent et al. (2005) who underline the need for 
humanitarian and development actors working with Somali people to understand the 
remittance economy. In the more stable areas, the concept of migrant-funded social 
insurance schemes and initiatives to facilitate diaspora investment in partnership with 
family members merit further exploration by humanitarian actors, local institutions, and 
businesspeople. Beyond remittances, migrants mobilise considerable donations to provide 
education and health services in the Somali regions: dialogue between the larger 
‘mainstream’ and diaspora-funded NGOs and initiatives might be fruitful. Last but not 
least, this analysis of remittances in Hargeisa points to the importance, in the context of 
increased global financial regulation and international scrutiny of international funds 
transfers (particularly to Islamic countries affected by conflict), of ensuring that financial 
channels are kept open so that migrants can continue to support their family members. 
Withdrawal or even disruption of these funds would be a catastrophic blow for the city. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 In contrast, political economy approaches conceptualize the conflicts of the 1990s as processes of political 
and economic re-ordering, linked to the affected countries’ postcolonial and post-Cold War situation and to 
their relations with the global economy (Keen 2001; Duffield 2001; Goodhand 2000). 
2 Official remittances data are produced based on the IMF’s Balance of Payments Yearbook. Unofficial 
remittances may represent as much as 50% of official remittances (World Bank 2006a). 
3 In 2004, official remittances were 10% or more of the GDP of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Kiribati, Lebanon, Lesotho, Moldova, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Philippines, Samoa, Serbia and Montenegro, Tajikistan, Tonga, and Yemen (World 
Bank 2006a). 
4 These estimates are not transparent and beset by issues of data quality and definition. 
5 The Somali clan families: Darod, Digil and Mirifle, Dir, Hawiye and Isaq (Brons 2001). 
6 For a more detailed account of political developments, see Bradbury, Abokor et al. (2003) 
7 According to King (2003), in 2003 the municipality estimate was 445,000, the UN was using an estimate 
of 300,000, the Ministry of Planning 375,000 and the Water Development Authority 600-700,000. 
8 See also Granovetter (1985) 
9 King 2003; Interviews and informal consultations with various remittance company managers. 
10 Data were analysed using SPSS. Methods are described in more detail in Lindley (2006) 
11 ‘Average’ denotes mean unless otherwise specified.  
12 For the purposes of the survey a crude co-residence definition of the household was used – ‘people you 
usually live with’. As people may not know for sure whether other family members receive remittances or 
how much, total household remittances calculated here is taken as an estimate, probably an underestimate. 
13 Amounts in this paragraph are rounded to the nearest $5. These findings contrast with the higher average 
remittance amount of $4,170 obtained in Ahmed’s (2000) survey of 116 recipient households in Hargeisa, 
possibly due to differences in the sample size and sampling approach. 
14 This is broadly supported by other sources: managers estimated that over half of their money transfer 
customers were women and this author’s survey of Somali remitters in London found 55% of regular 
recipients were women. 
15 20% of respondents had received money from more than one remitter. 
16 Note this is similar to the finding of the London survey (see above) and Ahmed’s (2000) Hargeisa 
survey. 
17 Notes 050402 
18 Interview 050816 (Resident) 
19 Interview 050824 (Resident) 
20 Notes 050912, 050809 and 050818 
21 Qaad is a green leaf that is chewed as stimulant: its use is on the increase since the conflict (Cabdi 2005).  
22 Notes 050809 (also 050818) 
23 Interviews in London, during 2004 and May 2005 
 25
                                                                                                                                                 
24 Interview 050828 (Resident) 
25 Remember that the survey sample is a little biased towards people who received remittances regularly. 
26 Reliable total income data was not obtained in this study. 
27 Biil is a catch-all term and can cover food, water and electricity, rent, school fees, and qaad. In some 
contexts biil can also mean ‘regular remittance’ (Notes 050228). 
28 Interview 050823a (Resident) 
29 For example, Somalis in London have the lowest foreign-born employment rate (Greater London 
Authority 2005).  
30 Interview 050824 (Resident) 
31 Average individual remittances were about $200 higher for recipients who were working than those who 
were not, and average estimated household remittances were about $500 higher in households that did have 
an alternative source of income to remittances. 
32 Many urban households see drought as a major environmental threat (UNDP 2003) 
33 Note that also some migrants who left and began remitting earlier may have stopped (they may have set 
up a business, helped relatives to emigrate or feel that they have ‘done their bit’) and therefore not appear 
in the sample. 
34 Notes 060813 
35 Interview 050823a (Resident) 
36 Notes 050326, 050910 and 050809; Interview 050823a (Resident) 
37 Sheikh Nur, Mohamed Mooge, Aw Aden, Ayaha, Sinia, Stadium, Dhami, State House and Beerta 
Xorriyada  
38 Medani (2000) found that no particular Isaq clan had the monopoly on remittances. 
39 Interviews 050823b (Government Official), 050811 (Educational Institution), 050326 (International 
NGO worker); Notes 050813, 050326, 050909, 050823, 050818, 050328. 
40 Interviews 050326b (Research Institution), 050823a (Resident) and 050424c (Remittance Company 
Manager) 
41 Notes 050321, 050812, 050320, 050813, 050323; Interview 050326b (Research Institution) 
42 Notes 050621 050813, 050606, 050630; Interview 050917 (Somali NGO) 
43 Notes 050328 
44 Interviews 050821a (Government Official), 050821a (International NGO worker), 050913 (Government 
Official) and 050324c (Remittance Company Manager) 
45 Quote from her speech at the Somaliland Recognition Debate, Portcullis House, London (Notes 040317).  
Also Notes 050524, 050606, 050326, 050815, 050909, 050320, 050321 
46 Interview 050329 (International NGO worker) 
47 Interview 050824 (Resident) 
